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BOOK REVIEWS
LAW AND ELECTRONICS:
The Challenge of a New
Era,* Edited, with a Foreword, by Edgar A. Jones, Jr., San
Francisco: Matthew Bender & Company, 1962. Pp. 373. $10.00.
Because Law and Electronicsreports on the first national
conference devoted to a consideration of the implications of
computer technology, lawyers who expect to be practicing in
Hardly an industry or
the computer age should read it.
service in this country remains unaffected in some degree
by the computer revolution.
Few individuals or groups can
long escape the need for expert legal advice concerning one
or another use of electronic and related devices and the legal
effects of such uses.
For reasons to be discussed later,
practicing lawyers are not the only persons for whom the
book should be recommended reading.
The questions
implicit in the conference goal range far beyond the bench
and bar into areas yet to be probed by lawyer and layman.
Organized under the sponsorship of the U.C.L.A.
Chancellor's Committee for Interdisciplinary Studies of Law
and the Administration of Justice, the conference focused on
several problems and problem areas, on descriptions of
current research and investigation, and on proposals for future
programs and projects under the following headings:
Electronics and the Administration of Justice; The Language of
the Machine and the Language of the Law; Logic and Law;
and the Element of Predictability in Judicial Decision Making.
While the principal papers dealt with only a few aspects of
the legal profession's role in the era of automata, conference
discussions covered a wide range of practical and theoretical
questions that set the stage for a second conference in 1962.1
* The Proceedings of the First
National Law and Electronics Conference.
Lake Arrowhead, California, October 21-23. 1960. Sponsored by the U.C.L.A.
Chancellor's Committee of Interdisciplinary Studies of Law and the Administration of Justice, and University Extension, University of California.

1.

"The summary program of the second Conference, suggested in large

part by the discussions at the first,
is as follows: Demonstrations of manmachine systems in the Systems Simulation Research Laboratory of the
System Development Corporation; Law, Electronics and the Problems of
Interdisciplinary Understanding; Survey of Electronic Data Processing

Relevant to the Administration of Justice; The Extent to which a Consensus
Is Attainable Concerning the Fundamental Legal Postulates of a Free Society; Appellate Function, Judical Decision, and the Role of the Computer;
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Readers unfamiliar with the small flow of intramural
communication concerning ways in which the legal profession
can begin to enjoy the benefits of electronic data processing
paraphernalia, 2 will find in the first two chapters a readable
summary of many arguments for and some of the problems
inherent in the conversion of law libraries into electronic
data storage, processing and retrieval centers.
H. P.
Edmundson's explanation of machine language presupposes
something more than a totally naive audience, but the remarks
by Richard Hayden and John Horty and the panelists for the
first two sessions supplement those of the hardware expert
and are instructive for persons unacquainted with computer
programming mystique and with current projects involving
the storage of statutory and case law in computers.
Chapter 3 on Logic and Law is a convenient survey of
Layman Allen's diverse interests that derive from his
perception of the relationships between modern logics and
legal language. From an initial concern with problems of
legal drafting, he has moved on to a consideration of ways
in which the "man" component of man-machine systems can
adapt legal language so as to make more efficient use of
machines than is possible with traditional modes of
expression.
Lee Loevinger's contribution in Chapter 4 is a stimulating
inquiry reaching far beyond his stipulated subject - prediction
of judicial decisions.
Readers heretofore alienated by the
piddling exercises exhibited in much of the existing literature
on this subject should find Judge Loevinger's thoughtful
commentary a refreshing, and perhaps persuasive, argument
for reconsideration of prediction and probabilistic thinking in
law.
Each of the four sessions was followed by conference
discussion.
Summary reports of the issues raised would
have been easier to read than the edited transcripts that
follow the principal papers.
Within the limitations of the
Problems Involved in Establishing Accessibility to Trial Court Data; and
Future Developments in
Information Retrieval and Their Implications

Relative to the Preservation of a Free Society." p. iv.

2.
See M.U.L.L. (Modern Uses of Logic in Law), quarterly published by
the American Bar Association Special Committee on Electronic Data Retrieval in collaboration with the Yale Law School. See also, symposium:
Jurimetries, LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROB. (Winter 1963).
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format used, however, the editor skillfully captured much
of the conference spirit by retaining the wit (especially that
of Arnold Dumey), overstatement (such as, computers
"absorb, organize and lay bare what today must, for lack
of accessibility, be regarded as a kind of subconscious of the
human race" p. 8), and sharp assault that characterizes
interdisciplinary debate. Unfortunately, the participants and
the editor lapsed into unenlightening cliche by allusions to
"Procrustean solutions" (p. 6), "the dehumanizing potential
of computers" (p. 5), and "contrived stereotype solutions
committed to the machine for rote recitation upon inquiry"
(p. 6).
Common sense rose from time to time to counteract
the distracting effects of such talk.
Said one impatient
conferee:
"I haven't observed lately any law libraries
practicing law, and I don't expect to see computing machines
practicing law any more than law libraries practice.
It's
as simple as that." (p. 139)
The last chapter is an edited transcript of the final
session. From it the reader should turn back, as in Finnegan's
Wake, to Edgar Jones' Introduction and Foreword for a
summary of conference results.
There, on second reading,
one gets a clearer picture of what was and what was not
considered in this conference.
The broader implications, both positive and negative, of
the computer revolution are described by editor Jones as
Liberation (or foreclosure) of man from routine
mental work . . . with the consequent release (or
unemployment) of his mental energies for creative
(or destructive) thinking to a degree not previously
possible (or necessary). (p. 9)
To cope with these alternatives is the unsolicited task of our
entire society.
In specifying a division of labor appropriate for those
trained in the law, the sponsors of the conference undertook
to seek means for achieving "justice in a society committed
to maintaining the maximum degree of individual free action"
in the context of automation and automata. (pp. 1,2)
Recalling Capek and Orwell, the editor expressed "hope that
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it is sufficiently appalling in the prospect that thoughtful and
able men and women will bestir themselves so that our
basic commitment to human dignity shall not be subverted
by unwise or simply unguided evolutions of machine techniques dissociated from their impact on human values." (p. 6)
Some of the discussions touched upon the implications of data
retrieval as it relates to individual liberty.
Allusions were
made to the existence of a "tremendous potential for the
infringement of the liberty of the individual," (p. 129) but
no further inquiry into these matters seems to have
developed.'
Certainly the conference agenda, outlined
above, was far less comprehensive than the conference goal
would suggest.
Those who are pursuing the goal of achieving justice in
a society committed to maintaining the maximum degree of
individual free action face gigantic tasks of problem
articulation and skill recruitment.
Readers of this volume
might ask who in our community is charting the future course
of law and lawyers in the electronic age?
Who, for example,
is bold enough to predict even a hundred foreseeable "new"
fact situations that are likely to challenge traditional ways
of allocating authority and legal responsibility?
Who is
beginning to sketch the rough profile of the institutions and
practices - legal and extralegal - that will develop in the
coming decades, and who, with adequate intellectual and
financial resources, is making an effort to change the shape
4
of both?
The conference focused not on these queries but upon
the identification of that band of revolutionaries who, with
armies of electronic machines, promise someday to free the
lawyer of his despised labor.
It is in this more narrow
context, therefore, that the usefulness of these proceedings
should be considered.
3. See n. 1, supra.
4. Occasional typographical misprints do not reflect serious discredit
on the scholarship or mechanics of issuing such a volume, but one gross
error deriving, no doubt, from the hazards of transcribing from tape recorded
sessions must be corrected. One "Ed Mitely" is cited in the text at p. 243
and in the index as well as the author of a paper on "Symbolic Logic in the
Interpretation of Documents." The proper reference is to Berkeley, Boolean
Algebra (The Techniques for Manipulating 'And,' 'Or,' 'Not.' and Conditions)
and Applications to Insurance, 26 RECORD OF AM. INST. OF ACTUARIES

373 (1937), 27 Id. 157 (1938).
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The editor appropriately chided the universities, foundations and legal scholars for "twitting themselves about juke
box judgments with button pushing idiots spewing out
decisions, while the serious evolution of the science of
computer information retrieval proceeds through its vital
threshold phase. .. without their influence." (p. 7) Engineer
Myron Tribus expressed the hope that
out of a conference like this there might come some
pressure to establish special research posts in universitities, where practicing lawyers or judges or
others could go for sabbaticals from their professional
positions to the universities and engage in research.
I believe that research should be done not only by
those who are "called" to it, but also by those who are
forced to do it because the problems they face today
don't yield to the tools they have. (p.137)
Assuming that all of the conditions favorable to the establishment of such posts in universities can be met by some
institution somewhere within a reasonable time, would it not
be wise to extend the suggested list of research candidates
to the lawbook publishers, our silent partners in law? Their
responses to the need for new tools will have profound effects
upon the way we respond to the challenges of the computer
If we propose a marriage with the machines, who
age.
outranks the publishers among the wedding guests? Librarian
J. M. Jacobstein reminded the conference that "You cannot
get good lawyers or good indexers now, to currently index
But someone has to index this material.
our material ....
How are we going to get law school graduates to index
material for machines when we can't get them to do it now?"
Elsewhere, the editor voiced a commonly held
(p. 341)
opinion when he said that we "shudder at the prospect" of
having the existing body of indexes, digests, and citators
automatically and without critical appraisal put into
the machine so as to perpetuate it for the next three
hundred years. One of the things we are rather hopeful about is that maybe we can get away from the
labor of the inexperienced and unimaginative and get
to labors which will reflect a higher level of compe(p. 147)
tence in the pursuit of justice.
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The point to be made here is that in this era of fashionable
dialogue among scholars and practitioners of various other
disciplines the publishers should be involved.
It is their
communications, not the learned journals, that appear on every
lawyer's shelf and that guide and limit his creative research
into the language of the law.
Publishers have much to teach,
and perhaps more to learn, in future inquiries into the
application of electronic data processing to legal materials.
On another level, it was suggested that a lawyers'
soliloquy might well precede further dialogue.
Commenting
that his own profession had learned much when it began investigating how engineers reasoned as they did their work, Mr.
Tribus suggested that lawyers might find in a self-survey valuable data on which to base future research.
This suggestion
may be covered by one of the projects "of immediate practical
importance and long-range research value" described by the
editor in the following terms:
"A study of the psychological
and physiological factors in solving legal problems and
making legal decisions." (p. 16)
Such a study should
certainly include investigations designed to record what
lawyers do, why they say they do it, and how much what they
are doing costs, all as a preliminary factual basis for the
investigation of possible uses of electronic data processing
devices in law practice.
If we had a rough catalog of the
decisions that are made by lawyers in their daily practice,
an estimate of which are usual and typical and which are
exceptional, we would be in a far better position to survey
the potential utility of the new machines.
The only people
who can provide such information are the practitioners themselves.
Doctors and other scientists frequently spend hours
or weeks as guinea pigs in their efforts to obtain significant
information for basic research.
Are there any lawyers
among us who are willing to permit their days to be clocked
in time-and-motion studies?
Will any of them permit each
of his decisions to be questioned, recorded, to be probed for
explanation in terms of strategy, motive, in order to provide
the raw data upon which researchers could work?
Research has been mentioned throughout Law and
Electronics and in this review.
How often it has communicated the range of activities intended to be covered by the
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term is a matter of speculation.
Practitioners have their
young associates, judges their law clerks, public officials
their research staffs, and professors their research assistants.
To date, however, there exists no generally accepted, no
meaningful definition of the terms "basic research" or
"research and development" in the law.
These terms, if
applicable at all, mean something quite different from a hunt
for the case in point, for the relevant statute, for the next
document in a chain of title.
"Basic research" means,
instead, the expenditure of time, personnel, effort and money
to explorations in problem areas which presently, or in the
near future, are bound to bear down upon the legal profession
and for which traditional legal training has not provided
appropriate solutions or techniques.
If this concept is converted into a program for action by
the group at U.C.L.A. that set these national conferences in
motion - or by any other institution that hopes to turn out
lawyers in the 1960's who think like lawyers of the '70's and
'80's - what are the necessary preconditions for success?
Institutional flexibility or tolerance for unorthodoxy, access
to experimental equipment at reasonable rates, a nucleus
group of highly motivated researchers with subject-matter
skills of wide range within and without the law, a wellarticulated goal and a comprehensive agenda that can
accomodate a variety of extensive and intensive probes into
problems of varying scope all are essential to the
realization of creative means for achieving justice in a society
committed to maintaining the maximum degree of individual
free action.
MARY ELLEN CALDWELL**

** Research Associate and Lecturer, Yale Law School, New Haven, Conn.

